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European Cosmopolitanism and Civil Society; Questions of Culture, 
Identity and Citizenship. 
 
‘Democracy is the slow, painful effort to put right the blunders that we have 









The concept of civil society has been essential to democratic theory and numerous 
social movements. The idea of civil society usually refers to the networks and 
associations that are formed between the home and the state that allow for public 
forms of discussion and argument. Talk of civil society came back during the eighties 
when a number of Eastern European dissident intellectuals pointed out how 
Communist practice and ideology severely restricted civic forms of expression. In the 
West a number of other writers also sought to point to the ways in which civic 
association was limited by privatised lifestyles, the power of money and the influence 
of dominant ideologies. The period directly proceeding the Cold War however has 
offered a different set of hopes and projections. The disappearence of the binary logic 
of the Cold War which had limited democratic experimentation in the West and the 
removal of state control in the East all heralded new prospects for civil society. Yet 
the power of the media of mass communication and mainstream poltical parties to 
control ‘political’ agendas, the dominance of consumer rather than politically oriented 
life-styles and the erosion of the public by market values continue to point to the 
withering of civil society rather than its growth and development. Further, there are 
more recent fears that Europe’s 9/11 in Madrid will by putting democracies on a 
permanent war footing lead to the progressive erosion of civil society. Ideologies of 
‘us’ versus ‘them’ not only restrict democratic horizons closing the minds of the 
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public to alternative forms of politics, but serves the interests of secrecy rather than 
publicity.   
 Here I wish to investigate these questions by returning to the essential 
ambiguity of the concept of civil society. It is with the double character of civil 
society that I wish to start. Present in the concept of civil society are democratic 
movements and political initiatives that offer the possibility of civic exchange and 
democratic argument, but also the possibility of normalisation and domination. The 
problem has been for many to concentrate on one side of the question to the exclusion 
of the other. We need to be able to hold onto the idea of civil society as a duality if we 
are to capture on the ongoing ambivalence of European civil society. Further, in an 
age of globalisation these features also need to be substantially recast so to build upon 
the possible emergence of new kinds of citizenship above and below the nation-state.  
Here we might return to some of the debates that emerged out of the 1989 
European revolutions. The so called velvet revolutions proposed new definitions of 
European civil society that are still being worked through today. In particular Mary 
Kaldor (2003) has argued that the distinctive contribution of 1989 invented the 
possibility of a genuinely European civil society. Despite, the views of other political 
theorists like Dahrendorf (1990) who argued the revolutions were a triumph for 
liberalism, Kaldor argues such views are too sweeping. The Anti-Politics of dissidents 
like Vaclav Havel, Georg Konrad and E.P.Thompson sought to develop an intellectual 
politics or civil society that did not compete for power, but create small islands of 
civic intiative. Beyond the disciplines of the bloc system, the aim was to invent 
transnational dialogues that sought to drag humanity back from the abyss of nuclear 
war and assured destruction. The revolutions of 1989 made possible the invention of a 
transnational civil society that could put pressure on the centers of political and 
economic authority.  
While being sympathetic to many of these arguments, the development of a 
European civil society has to be cast in different terms. While notions of civil society 
were mobilised to reveal the repression of civil exchange more symbolic forms of 
violence are not evident in the discussion. In other words, public exchange is not just 
an instrumental matter, but also signifies who is listening, who is talking and ofcourse 
who is excluded (Bourdieu 1991). These more ‘cultural’ definitions of the political 
will become apparent in what follows. We need to recognise that the communicative 
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possibilities of civil society are intimately bound up with how we deal with otherness 
and difference. 
In what follows, I want to look at the argument that a European civil society 
requires the support of cosmopolitan institutions, most notably in respect of the 
European Union. Here I investigate the position of liberal cosmopolitanism mainly 
through the writing of the prominent German social and political theorist Jurgen 
Habermas. Secondly, I make the argument that liberal cosmopolitanism can be 
criticised for neglecting to analyse the checkered history of civil society in the 
European context. Here the inevitably broad sweep of these viewpoints points to a 
different kind of politics that seeks to be more receptive towards the ‘Other’. Finally, I 
agree that a Europe that has been made safe for the ‘Other’ would need both a 
complex vocabulary of cultural identity and a more genuinely multicultural politics. It 
is to these features I shall now turn.    
 
 European Cosmopolitanism 
 
Since the fall of the Berlin wall the cosmopolitan view has sought to dispense with 
specifically national responses. Citizenship, it follows, has to become a trans-national 
form of governance by breaking with the cultural hegemony of the state. A 
cosmopolitan political community should be based upon overlapping or multiple 
citizenships connecting the populace into local, national, regional and global forms of 
governance. The cosmopolitan polity, guided by the principle of autonomy, would 
seek to achieve new levels of interconnectedness to correspond with an increasingly 
global world. These dimensions remain vital, surpassing older divisions in the 
democratic tradition between direct and representative democracy by seeking to 
maximise the principle of autonomy across a range of different levels. The prospects 
for a cosmopolitan democracy is guided by the argument that problems such as HIV, 
ecological questions and poverty are increasingly globally shared problems.  
Jurgen Habermas (1997) locates ideas of cosmopolitan democracy in Kant's 
(1970) desire to replace the law of nations with a genuinely morally binding 
international law. Kant believed that the spread of commerce and the principles of 
republicanism could help foster cosmopolitan sentiments. As European citizens 
individuals would act to cancel the egoistic ambitions of individual states.  Kant's 
vision of a peaceful cosmopolitan order based upon the obligation by states to settle 
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their differences through the court of law has arguably gained a new legitimacy in a 
post cold-war world. For Habermas (1997) while this vision retains a contemporary 
purchase, it has to be brought up to date by acknowledging a number of social 
transformations. This includes the globalisation of the public sphere and the declining 
power of states, while also recognising that it is individuals and citizens and not 
collectivities who need to become sovereign. In this setting the European Union takes 
on an added significance given its commitment to a pluralistic democracy, the rule of 
law and the protection of human rights. Indeed observance of these principles is a key 
condition for a states membership. Membership also entails the obligation to continue 
to respect these rights with the European Commission retaining special enforcement 
procedures. Hence despite its many detractors from the beginning Europe has been 
more than a trading bloc and represents a new kind of transnational political 
community. The European Union, as is well known, emerged into a society ravaged 
by war and nationalist violence with the question of collective security being central 
to its foundation. However, as most observers recognise, the process of European 
integration has been driven as much by economic considerations as political aims and 
objectives (Anderson 1997). This has not prevented many on the political Left from 
investing in the idea of Europe a utopian significance that aims to tame globalisation, 
enhance democracy and put European societies on a more secure footing than was 
evident for the early part of the twentieth century. In this context, Habermas has 
recently advocated the need for a constitutional debate that would engage the 
collective imaginations of the citizens of Europe. The challenge for the European 
Union is to be able to conserve the democratic achievements of the nation-state in a 
global era. What has seemed to many of its critics as institution building without the 
necessary democratic legitimacy, is actually a normative political project that can be 
sharpely contrasted with the overt power politics represented by the worlds remaining 
super power the United States.  
Despite the widespread unpopularity of the European Union with many of its 
citizens, Habermas argues that there are five main reasons for supporting its 
development. Firstly, as is well known, many of the founders of the European Union 
were motivated by the immediate memory of war and nationalist violence. This 
remains a strong motivating force behind the need to develop post-national forms of 
solidarity and security. In this vision Europe is not only a tading bloc, but an 
integrative force seeking to collectively bind nation-states to a legal community. 
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Secondly, as I have already mentioned, the history of European nation-states saw 
national consciousness and democracy develop along with one another. Yet there is 
no reason why democracy and civic solidarity should remain at this level. That is the 
legitimacy of the European Union will indeed depend upon the creation of a civil 
society beyond national borders. For Habermas, despite his nationalist critics, there is 
no good reason why this might not be possible. Thirdly, Europe remains a global 
space of democracy and human rights that has few current rivals. While ideas of 
democracy and human rights are not owned by Europe and not withstanding its own 
barbarous past, these features have an institutional grounding that are part of a wider 
collective achievement.  Fourthly, European societies face a number of common 
problems which are easier to deal with collectively than alone. These include global 
markets, immigration and asylum seekers as well as increasing levels of 
fragmentation and multiculturalism. There is then the growing realisation that 
individual states can not protect their citizens from the ‘external’ realities of 
globalisation nor some of its ‘internal’ consequences. Fifthly, and in Habermas’s 
estimation the key to the success of the European Union, is its ablity to provide a 
response to global economic pressures. Under the conditions of global finance 
national governments are under increasing pressure to lower taxes and provide 
economic environments in the interests of corporations rather than people. Such down 
ward pressures compel national governments to accept increasing inequalities while 
downgrading systems of social welfare. In this scenario what happens is that money 
replaces politics. Here the European Union would need to develop a market-
correcting ethos with new forms of regulation and redistribution.     
 In terms of the development of European cosmopolitan identities, Habermas 
(2001a) has more recently outlined some of the key conceptual disputes. Opposed to 
either a Euroskeptic vision of Europe or a neoliberal market driven notion of Europe, 
Habermas makes the case for a cosmopolitan Europe. This version of European 
identity has at heart the ability of citizens ‘to learn to mutually recognise one another 
as members of a common political existence beyond national borders’ (Habermas 
2001b: 99). This does not mean homogenising different national and ethnic identities 
into a super European nation-state. A cosmopolitan European identity actually 
requires a form of civic solidarity where fellow Europeans take responsibility for one 
another. These processes are dependent not only on the formulation of a common 
European civil society, constitution and social policy, but on a common sense of 
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solidarity being created through political institutions. The development of a European 
cosmopolitan identity is dependent upon civic forms of solidarity being developed 
beyond the nation. Habermas goes on that only when Europe is able to develop a 
genuinely post-national democracy will it be able to provide an alternative to both 
economic globalisation and shared histories of barbaric nationalism. Habermas is well 
aware this remains a considerable challenge in the context of competing ideas about 
Europeaness that continue to dominate the political landscape. 
 Hence Habermas is clear that a European identity could not be a matter of a 
shared culture or religion, but is likely to be the uneven outcome of a European wide 
public sphere. Further, that Europeaness would usher in a composite identity that 
sought to interact with and not replace national, ethnic and regional identities. There 
is no reason why a commitment to locality, nationhood and Europeaness could not all 
flourish in the twenty-first century. For Habermas, just as European states of the 
nineteenth century created national consciousness, then something similar may 
become possible at the European level. In Habermas’s terms the best bet of a more 
cosmopolitan Europe is a prolonged debate on the European constitution. While such 
a process, in Habermas’s words (2003:98) ‘will not be enough’, it will at least set a 
European wide dialogue in motion. After a period of ongoing debate and controversy 
within national public spheres citizens are likely to discover that they share common 
interests with others across national borders. A European civil society is likely to 
become activited through mediated processes of political communication. Hence a 
cosmopolitan European identity is an emergent composite identity where 
identification with others emerges through specifically national public spheres and 
public communication (Delanty 1998). This is indeed a different model to those who 
dream of discovering a European idenity through a re-emerged high culture or 
Christain identity. The only other ‘cultural’ preconditions Habermas recognises in 
respect of the development of a European cosmopolitan identity is the need for 
education systems to provide a common linguistic basis. Hence it is transnational 
political communication underlined by a supportive education system that offers the 
optimum prospects for a European cosmopolitan society. 
 Here we might argue that Habermas’s description of a European cultural 
identity remains overly minimal and could be given a ‘thicker’ content. It is likely that 
Habermas’s liberalism warned him off such a venture should such a description be 
misunderstood as a description of the cultural requirements that would constitute 
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‘Europeaness’. Habermas is undoubtedly right to tread cautiously here given that most 
other writers working on the idea of a European civil society emphasis not only 
Europes linguistic and cultural plurality, but that the vast majority of its citizens live 
their lives within the nation within which they were born (Outhwaite 2003). However, 
as Maurice Roche (2001) demonstrates, at the level of cultural policy and popular 
culture there has emerged significant developments in this respect. The creation of 
events such as the European city of culture, the development of a European tourist 
industry, Erasmus and Socretes exchange programmes, and the Europeanisation of 
sport and football all link questions of culture and citizenship in more concrete ways 
than Habermas suggests. However, while recognising the importance of these 
processes, a word of caution needs to be added here. For Castells (1998) the idea of 
European identity can not be assumed but needs to be politically invented. Hence the 
idea of Europe could become important as a way of defending human rights, 
democracy and social welfare without regressing into communalism. Europeaness 
then would need to become what Castells (1997:8) describes as a project identity. A 
project identity becomes available when social actors and movements seek to 
simulateously redefine themselves and their position within society. Yet under current 
conditions, most of the identities that Castells charts can more accurately be described 
as resistant or communal identities. Under the impact of globalisation and the 
shrinking state, both radical individualism and fundamentalist certitude are currently 
more prevalent than project identities.  
Similarly, Alain Touraine (2000) argues that it is only by embracing 
multiculturalism that Europe can avoid the twin threats of rampant individualism and 
regressive communalism. Hence in distinction from liberalisms ideas of tolerence or 
Habermas’s of political communication, Touraine argues for a Europe that is based 
upon the ethic of inter-cultural communication. This would move society beyond 
models of either unrestricted pluralism, communalism or the elite forms of political 
dialogue described by Habermas. The key here is not merely to provide identification 
with a European constitution amongst those involved in the political process, but 
allow for communication between cultural enclaves. Hence an inclusive European 
identity would need to make space for the ‘Other’ and recognise the relations of 
dominance that have previously existed between them. The European project is better 
served by a form of politics that provides spaces and places where inter-cultural 
dialogue can take place. These are important considerations to which I shall return 
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later. For now, it is important to note Touraine’s view is more suggestive than 
specifically realised. He does however acknowledge a key dimension that has been 
overly subsumed by our discussion thus far. That is given Europe’s long history of 
nationalist violence, chauvenism and racism where does this leave Habermas’s vision 
of a cosmopolitan Europe?  
 
A Europe for the Other ? 
 
The quest for a European cosmopolitan social order looks somewhat different against 
the back ground of the long history of European racism and nationalist violence. 
Whereas liberal cosmopolitanism  keeps open the possibility of a Europe built upon 
rationality, social justice and democracy viewed against a history of genocide such 
sure footed ideas of moral progress are difficult to sustain. Indeed just as the 
cosmopolitans make their appeal for a new European order based upon the 
transnational application of Enlightenment principles so we have also witnessed the 
rise of the far Right and racist froms of reaction to asylum seekers and immigration. 
In this respect, Europe less resembles the rational polity, than a place of fear, anxiety 
and hatred. Here the charge is that the European enlightenment has a barbarous 
heritage and that ideals of cosmopolitan democracy seek to obscure this from view.  
 Zygmunt Bauman (1995) has argued that the shadows of Auschwitz and the 
Gulag continue to cast their shadows over more liberal forms of collective identity. 
European modernity is as much about the establishment of the principles of liberal 
democracy as it is of racism and the politics of genocide. We might then choose to 
console ourselves with ideas of European civilisation and democracy, and yet we live 
under the continual threat of new waves of barbarism. It is noticeable, that most of the 
advocates of a European civil society tend in William Outhwaite’s (2003:1) phrase, to 
‘be looking at the brighter side of the European picture’. Indeed, Bauman argues that 
rather than seeing the death camps as a form of atavism we might view them as the 
expression of European modernity. In other words, European genocide was made 
possible by rationality, technology and science. The development of modern 
bureaucratic rationality and functional division of labour leads to the floating of 
responsibility. Moral impulses are neutralised by the modern requirement to forefill a 
role and reach targets while remaining loyal to an organisation. The holocaust is less 
symbolised by rage rather than the willingness to follow orders. Bauman writes: 
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‘The modern mind treats the human habitat as a garden, whose ideal shape is to be 
predetermined by carefully blueprinted and meticulously followed up design, and 
implemented through the encouraging the growth of bushes and flowers envisaged by 
the plan – and poisoning or uprooting the rest, the undesirable and the unplanned, the 
weeds’ (Bauman 1995:199). 
Along with modernity comes liberal democracy and the dream of a society 
free of ambivalence, otherness and cultural difference. The aim of the modern spirit is 
to push humankind toward a society that is orderly, rationalised and where all social 
problems have been solved. Hence modernity’s self image of the progressive 
elimination of violence and the establishment of a genuinely civil society is a false 
one.  Instead in modernity violence is made invisible by being removed from the 
fabric of everyday life. Violence becomes professionalised in armies and police forces 
maintained by a bureaucratic hierarchy (Bauman 1989). Similarly, Michel Foucault 
(1977) argued that the modern disciplinary society contains within its rituals the 
utopian ideal of the perfectly governed community. Human multiplicity is managed 
through a number of mechanisms that aim to ensure through legal-administrative 
forms of punishment that power flows with as little resistance as possible. The Janus 
faced nature of European modernity is charaterised as much by the deliberative ideals 
of democracy and modern social movements as it is by practices of surveillance and 
exclusion. In Bauman’s and Foucault’s terms the idea of Europe should become 
detached from notions of ‘moral leadership’. Following the writer Caryl Phillips 
(1986) Europeans remain trapped inside an illusion of supremacy that allows them to 
forget their own barbarous past. This is a dream ‘in which whites civilise and discover 
and the height of sophistication is to sit in a castle with a robe of velvet and crown 
dispensing order and justice’(Phillips, 1986:121). Phillips goes on that the idea that 
facism was simply an ideology that can be connected to a ‘lunatic fringe’ is 
increasingly difficult to sustain in the context of continued and sustained European 
racism. 
Notably the histories of national socialism that continue to haunt modern 
Europe can also be related to a hyper-masculine politics. The work of Klaus 
Theweleit (1989) has sought to explore the previously uncharted world of fascist man. 
Theweleit’s study explores the development of a warrior masculinity where the 
psychique is imagined as a suit of armour and whose self is erected against the fear of 
the feminine. It is the idea of the feminine that constitutes the most radical threat to an 
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identity built upon hardness, destruction and self-denial. The body of the fascist male 
is imagined to be a functioning machine that aims to repudiate any sense of more 
feminine values. While it is at least arguable that modern European soceities have 
begun to deconstruct these phantasies many of these projections continue to be 
apparent in much popular culture especially in respect of sport and representations of 
war and the body [1]. In this respect, the ‘othering’ and fear of the ‘feminine’ remains 
a dominant masculine ideology. 
 The charge is that the struggle for European cosmopolitanism displaces some 
of the more ‘hidden’ features of European modernity in respect of violence, race and 
gender. We might also note that modernity under certain calculations does not have 
the cognitive and emotional resources for the forms of solidarity demanded by 
European cosmopolitanism.  Mestrovic (1997) has recently taken these views the 
furthest by arguing that we are currently living in a postemotional society. This is a 
society of synthetic feeling where we have all become progressively indifferent to the 
suffering of others. How else, charges Mestrovic, are we to understand Europe’s 
indifference to the practice of genocide in Bosnia? Civilisation in Europe and the 
Western world has come to mean the ability to exhibit refined manners alongside a 
cool indifference to televised murder. The postemotional society values 'being nice' 
over the collective ability to be able to act on our emotions and intervene to help 
others. Hence the capacity to be able to feel real deep emotions in an age which 
endlessly simulates sentiment through news bulletins, talk shows and soap operas is 
being progressively undermined. The display of feeling is short lived, useless, 
aesthetic and luxurious and rarely becomes connected to a sense of justice and a 
genuine concern for humanity. Emotions are progressively regulated by pre-packaged 
sentiment and the crocodile tears of journalists reporting from war zones. 
Postemotionalism disallows the possibility of emotions becoming chaotic; instead 
they are increasingly subject to 'politically correct' forms of regulation. This cleaned 
up universe leaves little room for the strong passions and commitments necessary for 
the kind of European project described by the cosmopolitans. The idea of a Europe 
built upon social solidarity is less likely than a European Disneyland that manages a 
few pious sentiments in respect of the holocaust but manages to look the other way 
when confronted with real suffering. In this respect, the European Union becomes a 
MacDemocracy based upon consumerism and a thin commitment to the ideals of an 
active civil society.  
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 The argument here is not only that within European cosmopolitanism we may 
detect an attempt to bury the past, but in a consumerist society of simulated emotion it 
is just another fake identity. The media’s domination of politics leads to form of 
instantaneous democracy that is based upon personalisation, the simplification of 
political positions and where state and European politics have become empty rituals 
(Castells 1997). Notably these are very real threats to the life-worlds of Europe’s 
citizens. They can not I would argue be dismissed as the exaggerated fears of a few 
cantankourous European intellectuals [2]. Yet we might also reply, that these features 
could be pressed too far. Ulrich Beck (2004) has recently commented that the 
European project was actually born out of resistance to the perversion of European 
values. This argument works on two different levels. Firstly, cosmopolitan Europe 
does indeed emerge out of the rejection of totalitarian politics and practice. The 
politics of pluralism, democracy and human rights is affirmed over the states attempt 
to define the ‘truly human’, and attempts to exclude or annihilate those who do not fit 
this model. Secondly, the idea of cosmopolitan Europe is built on the notion that we 
have a moral duty to attend to the suffering of others and respect for human dignity. 
Europe is indeed built upon a contradiction between traditions of nationalism , 
genocide and colonial violence are indeed European, but it is also the location that has 
sought to development of legal standards that outlaw these acts. Indeed rather than 
condemning Europe as its radical critics attempt to do we might be best served 
seeking to strengthen ‘a European antidote to Europe’ (Beck 2004: 4). Hence the 
project for European cosmopolitanism could reasonably reply that if we are indeed to 
invent such a culture out of the turmoil of the present then this legitimates the process 
of democratic instituion building in the face of the barbarous past and the globalised 
markets of the present. Related to this question is how can European civil societies 
retain a place for the ‘Other’? How might we foster civic and cultural identities that 
discover new levels of respect for democracy, peace and cultural difference? It is to 
these thorny questions that I shall now turn. 
 
European Cosmopolitanism and Cultural Difference 
 
At this point, I want to build upon the arguments of the previous section and maintain 
that liberal cosmopolitanism needs to be reformulated. Here I take the view both that 
the institution of democracy and human rights at the European level is a form of 
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moral progress and that it needs to more fully take account of questions of cultural 
difference. Further, that the introduction of questions of cultural identity, as we have 
seen in respect of race and gender, problematises what comes to constitute the 
political in European societies. The problem with liberalism is that its individualism is 
unlikely to provide the necessary conditions for a genuinely multicultural community. 
In this respect, I want to turn to feminist and anti-racist writers who have sought to 
develop a version of cosmopolitanism that takes the questions of culture and identity 
more seriously than Habermas’s more abstract reflections.  
The question here becomes how are European societies to provide the 
necessary protection for those whose identities are excluded by more mainstream 
versions of politics and the public sphere? In this respect, I shall argue that both 
difference feminism and critical multiculturalism pose difficult questions for the 
liberalism of writers such as Habermas. Both feminist and critical multiculturalist 
perspectives share a similar set of concerns with cosmopolitan liberalism for the need 
to revive democracy, but argue much more systematically for the need to respect 
cultures of difference rather than liberal ideas of diversity. 
Cultural feminism has long had to live with the paradox of wanting to preserve 
the ‘feminine’, while also wanting to deconstruct the ways women’s identities are 
imprisoned within certain assumptions. Hence there has developed a cultural politics 
that has mutually sought to point to the continued dominance of masculinity, while 
subverting these assumptions in ways that do not entrench the discrimination of 
women. Here I want to look at some of the productive suggestions offered by the 
French feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray whose recent writing offers a vision of 
European societies reconstructed through questions of difference. 
 For Irigaray if we are to avoid the horror of Europe’s past and construct a 
citizenship that is based on more than property rights and markets then we need to 
make the public domain safe for the Other. This would be a form of citizenship that 
actively resists human-beings being reduced to producing and consuming ‘robots’ that 
cultivates a ‘culture of life’ (Irigaray 2000). Ultimately citizenship needs to take 
account of the fact that within the wider community there exist people of different 
cultures, genders, races and traditions. However, Irigaray’s fear is that in the push for 
European economic integration capitalism is actually producing a culture that is 
threatening sustainable human life. Under the law of the market European peoples are 
increasingly stressed, forced to live and work at ever faster rates and quickly forget 
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the lessons of human history. Further, that a culture that disrespects the environment, 
different sexualities, women and ethnic minorities can not be corrected through 
discourses of equality and liberal neutrality. The continued hegemony of the market, 
masculine values, Western ideas of logic and rationality require more concerted forms 
of deconstruction. What is important in the European setting is the establishment of a 
new symbolic order which signifies a much needed next stage of human development. 
Hence the ‘cultural’ is given priority over the economic in seeking to create a new 
society. It is then the task of critical forms of analysis not simply to restrict ourselves 
to where we are, but to courageously ask what we might become. In order to begin to 
answer these questions, we need to begin the task of reconstructing human 
subjectivity in respect of the relationship between the masculine and the feminine. 
 For Irigaray we have to start with the recognition that humanity is made up of 
two different beings. It is the cultivation of the relation between men and women and 
not the subordination of one pole to the other that will secure human flourishing. 
Mature human subjectivity therefore depends upon the ability to relate to the other 
who is not oneself. This is ofcourse only possible if we follow a strategy for 
citizenship that prefers the acceptance of difference over assimulation. European 
cultures today have a historic opportunity to develop a citizenship that goes beyond 
the nation-state and reworks the civic relation between men and women. The crisis of 
the family and the relative decline of patriarchal authority means that we have the 
opportunity to culturally disassociate ourselves from a dominant masculinity and 
establish the civic identities of the masculine and the feminine on an equal footing. 
This, argues Irigaray, requires the acceptance of new rights at the European level to 
protect women’s right to be women. These rights would grant women an equivalent 
identity with that of men. The hope being that by giving feminity a civil basis it would 
grant women: 
‘the conscious and voluntary recognition, in love and in civility, of the other as other. 
This cultural becoming of the woman will then be able to help the man to become 
man, and not only master and father of the world, as he has too often been in History’ 
(Irigaray 2002: 130). 
 In arguing for a new European civic identity for men and women, it is 
women’s cultural identity that requires special forms of protection. Here Irigaray 
(1994) draws upon earlier work where she seeks to establish a legal basis for the right 
to motherhood and the right to virginity for women. The aim is to promote a shared 
 14 
civil identity across Europe that fosters women’s self respect and secures the 
communal recognition of their physical and moral identity. These rights are not 
intended to be kept within a narrow legal framework, but would also seek to promote 
a wider collective culture of respect for women’s cultural identity. The aim being to 
give women an equal footing in the public sphere, but also create a positive form of 
female friendly citizenship. These rights would establish the respect for human life as 
a European norm.  
 Irigaray’s argument offers a substantive critique of the liberalism of writers 
such as Habermas and liberal feminism more generally. While not doubting the 
importance of equal opportunity legislation for women it has failed to establish a 
wider respect for the feminine and the Other more generally within European 
societies. For example, the right to participate in the workplace with men fails to 
protect motherhood as a positive identity. Turning motherhood into a positive choice 
is impossible in a culture that promotes the masculine values of competition, 
individualism and instrumentality over those of nurturance and care. In this respect, 
Irigaray disagrees with those feminists who view gender identity as simply a form of 
oppression. Granting women an equal civil status with men would have implications 
for the value that modern soceities place on the practice of caring for others.  
Unusually for a philosopher of difference Irigaray along with the European 
MEP Renzo Imbeni has written a consultative document called the Draft Code of 
Citizenship (reprinted in Irigaray 2000: 69-72) that was put forward to the European 
Commission for Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs. Interestingly the report was 
rejected by the European Parliament over the need to recognise the difference 
between men and women. The Commission for Women’s Rights preferring to stick 
with a defintion of liberal feminism that did not seem to ascribe identities in the way 
that Irrigaray’s report seemed to suggest (Martin 2003). Indeed, it remains the case 
that Irigaray often runs the biological identity of ‘woman’ and the ‘feminine’ together 
in such a way that have led to accusations of ‘essentialism’ from many of her critics. 
The problem being for a politics of citizenship is that it is not possible to protect the 
cultural values we might describe as being feminine without also granting women 
rights. However, this would have to be done in such a way that did not discount that 
men might also wish to think of themselves as mothers, peacemakers and having a 
sense of responsibility towards the community that went beyond the confines of 
narrow individualism. For example, Sara Ruddick (1990) has famously argued that 
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there remains a deep connection between maternal values and the politics of peace 
and anti-violence within civil society. However, she clearly recognises that 
maternalism (the need to protect, nurture and train children) is a practice that can be 
undertaken by men as well as women. This said the feminization of citizenship would 
involve the inclusion of virtues such as caring, compassion and responsibility for the 
vulnerable that has often been the product of specifically women’s campaigns 
(Werbner 1999). The introduction of new human qualities into the domain of 
citizenship could only be achieved by redrawing the balance between masculine and 
feminine values. Irrigaray’s point remains that before this can be achieved women 
must be granted equal civil status to men before questions of cultural difference can 
be renegotiated.  
Further, the  key question in respect of my earlier reflections is the argument 
for a Europe that seeks to protect racial and ethnic minorities. Indeed, this debate has 
particular significance in light of the vulnerability of ethnic minorities in the context 
of the war on terror. The increase in racist attacks, the languages of civilisations and 
the enhanced suspicion of Muslims across Europe all make these vital questions. One 
of the ways that many writers have sought to empower ‘minorities’ is to give them 
rights. Difference-blind liberalism can not protect ‘minority’ languages and traditions 
in a hegemonic culture of market led choice. Will Kymlicka (2001) a defender of 
minority rights makes a distinction between good and bad multicultural rights. Good 
minority rights aim to protect groups from the power of majorities or the external 
threats posed by living in potentially in-hospitable cultures. On the other hand, bad 
minority rights would seek to protect cultural enclaves from internal dissent and from 
individuals who wish to exit and live their lives in different communities. By 
defending the rights of minorities, Kymlicka argues that we are able to reveal the 
extent to which liberalism unmasked actually supports certain languages, cultural 
practices and lifestyles over others. While Kymlicka is mainly concerned with the 
rights of settled national minorities (such as the Catalans in Spain) here I am mainly 
concerned with his view of immigrants. Previously, Kymlicka had been criticised by 
Parekh (2001) for his view of culture that leads him to dismiss the claims to special 
rights by immigrants. As immigrants have left their ‘natural’ cultural home then they 
should have no rights to culture, and are required to integrate into the host culture. 
Hence whereas national ‘minorities’ have specific cultures that require recognition, 
the culture of immigrants should be denied public expression. Yet in a world of 
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unprecedented cultural mobility in terms of peoples and symbols it makes little sense 
to argue that cultures are confined to national and ethnic boundaries. Partially in 
response, Kymlicka now argues that immigrants rather than demanding special rights 
can demand fairer terms of integration. The demand at the national level then 
becomes to promote a political, educational and media culture that both recognises 
and respects the culture and identity of immigrant populations.  
Kymlicka presumes that questions concerning the respect for immigrants is the 
‘natural’ territory of nation-states. Here we might ask whether there is a wider 
European role for the protection of national minorities and immigrant communities? If 
European identity is to be conceived as multiple and overlapping then to what extent 
might ‘Europe’ seek to secure and protect the identities of minority communities? 
This is indeed a question, as Craig Calhoun (2001) has argued, that Europe must 
eventually face. However, just as the rights to recognise distinctive genders have been 
charged with essentialism so the same might be said of minority rights. For example, 
Stuart Hall (2000) has argued we need to be careful that demands for group rights do 
essentalise minority communities. Here the fear is that by giving rights to minorities 
we will actually interfere with the complex processes of negotiation and hybridisation 
and reverse into new forms of ethnic closure. Again this does not close the prospect of 
group rights but suggests that we proceed with caution should we end up naturalising 
community relations. Indeed, Hall argues less for cultural rights and more for a 
statutory obligation on the part of government for the duty to expose and confront 
racism. 
The demand to protect cultural identities at the European level both criticises 
liberal cosmopolitanism and asks complex questions around notions of identity. 
Notably Habermas’s model of European political communication underestimates the 
importance of this debate. It is unlikely that the political and mediated discourses 
ushered in at this level would not reinforce some of the dominant features of host 
national cultures. The problem with procedural arguments such as those of Habermas 
is that they fail to recognise that public conversations are likely to be shaped by 
powerful codes and discourses. 
Our question, however, has been how women and minorities might be 
empowered within this process? We have considered the possibility of granting them 
rights that go beyond the liberal forms of neutrality that remains the dominant form of 
European politics. We have noted considerable problems in this regard. Indeed I think 
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we need to accept that the protection of minorities from racism and the redrawing of 
masculinity and feminity is unlikely to be guaranteed by a rights driven discourse. In 
this respect, I think we need to develop an ambivalent discourse on the protection 
given by rights. If as many now argue cultural identities are becoming increasingly 
reflexive in post-traditional societies then to grant certain identities rights however 
well intentioned will inevitably remain problematic (Giddens 1991) More important 
than communal rights is the development of European wide civic cultures of 
multicultural solidarity that also seeks to question the languages of racial and 
gendered privilege. A European multiculturalism would require an enhanced 
liberalism that seeks to undermine the privileges of cultural hierarchies and assert a 
respect for difference beyond essentialism (Giroux 1994, Gilroy 2004). Arguably 
there are many features in contemporary European cultures that are pressing these 
questions from often  ambivalent popular cultures to the changing role of men in the 
family and from the partial acceptance of multiculturalism to political campaigns 
inspired by feminism and black rights organisations.  Multiculturalism only becomes 
possible if we are both willing to value difference, but to do so in a spirit of solidarity 
and community with the other (Melucci 1996). A generative civil society requires a 
two fold logic of a respect for otherness and communication. Such a vision suggests a 
vision of a future Europe based upon a concern for the well-being of our neighbours 
along with the desire to make a polity free from normalising assumptions. A 
genuinely cosmopolitan Europe would also need to become a multicultural Europe. 
 
A new European political logic ? 
 
This article has sought to argue that the double nature of civil society in the European 
context does indeed necessitate the building of new political institutions like the 
European Union. The liberal emphasis upon human rights and democracy especially 
in the context of economic globalisation and the developing ‘war on terror’ make 
these commitments ever more pressing. However, I have also sought to argue that 
liberalism’s blind spot remains the way in which the polity is conceptualised as a 
neutral domain hence missing the effect of powerful cultural discourses and 
exclusions. These questions can only be highlighted through more concerted attempts 
to reflect upon the contributions of cultural feminism and multiculturalism in the 
context of European societies. Such an argument would suggest that our models of 
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cosmopolitanism need to include both processes of institution building and an 
appreciation of the ways in which dominant models of citizenship have become 
constructed. The recent upsurge in populist racism in respect of asylum seekers and 
masculinist politics evident in the ‘war on terror’ will makes these features difficult to 
achieve. Yet the survival of a critical liberalism and social and cultural protest 
continue to offer sources of hope for the future. 
 
Notes 
1. For example, see my recent work on the culture of men’s lifestyle magazines as an 
example of the way that dominant masculine fantasies about the body continue to be 
reproduced within modernity. This work was carried out with Peter Jackson and Kate 
Brookes (2001). 
2.This problem is highlighted if we consider the liberal optimism of writers like John 
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